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Abstract. In a world where trusting software systems is increasingly
important, formal methods and formal proof can help provide trustable
foundations. Proof checking can help to reduce the size of the trusted base
since we do not need to trust an entire theorem prover if we can check
the proofs they produce by a trusted (and smaller) checker. Many ap-
proaches to building proof checkers require embedding within them a full
programming language. In most many modern proof checkers and the-
orem provers, that programming language is a functional programming
language, often a variant of ML. In fact, parts of ML (e.g., strong typ-
ing, abstract datatypes, and higher-order programming) were designed to
make ML into a trustworthy “meta-language” for checking proofs. While
there is considerable overlap in the foundations of logic programming and
proof checking (both benefit from unification, backtracking search, effi-
cient term structures, etc), the discipline of logic programming has, in
fact, played a minor role in the history of proof checking. I will argue that
logic programming can have a major role in the future of this important
topic.
1 Introduction
There are a number of theorem provers used by academics and industry and the
kinds of formalisms that they take on are becoming increasingly complex and
important. For example, computer systems such as Coq, HOL/Lite, and Isabelle
have been used to help formally prove the four color theorem [18], the Kepler
conjecture [20], and the correctness of a compiler [26] and a micro kernel [24].
For theorem provers to be part of our approach to trusting formalized math-
ematics and software systems, such provers must be trusted as well. However,
trusting modern theorem provers is proving difficult since over time they become
increasingly more complex: they evolve to allow for stronger inference rules and
for the integration of specialized proving technology. Furthermore, one might
not wish to require that theorem provers are formally trusted since anything
that is formally validated has stopped evolving and is not generally subject to
innovation and improvements.
1.1 Validate proofs, not provers
One method for addressing the correctness of theorem provers is to move from
formally validating an entire theorem prover to simply validating individual
proofs that are emitted by provers. With such a move, we need to trust the
proof checker instead of the entire theorem prover: presumably a checker is much
simpler and does not need to evolve frequently. Some provers, like Coq, separate
the activity of theorem proving from proof checking by providing its own kernel
which checks all proposed proofs. There are, however, several reasons why it is
desirable to move the proof checking operation to be outside a theorem prover.
– One of the philosophically motivated aspects of proofs must surely be their
ability to communicate across time and space the reason to trust that a for-
mula is indeed true [30]. Moving proof checkers outside a prover emphasizes
that proofs are meant to be communicated, at least from prover to checker.
– When the kernel is part of a prover, there is a great tendency for the kernel to
provide exactly what the prover needs: such a communication would evolve
to just involve two entities (the kernel and prover) instead of the many
possible other actors which might also want to check, trust, and use a proof.
– Finally, when the checker is formally separated from the prover, the structure
of emitted proofs and the semantics of the kernel would become indepen-
dent of the technology of the prover. Anyone could, therefore, reimplement
the kernel and check the emitted proofs. Having several kernels by several
different teams of implementers provides a well recognized path to having
increased trust in software.
An example of an architecture for moving proof checking outside of theorem
provers is currently being explored and implemented within the Dedukti system
[11]. Dedukti is based the λΠ-modulo formal framework of Cousineau and Dowek
[9] which mixes two well-known and powerful frameworks, one for hypothetical
reasoning (via the dependently typed λ-calculus known as LF [21] and λΠ) and
one for functional programming style computations (via confluent rewriting).
The Dedukti project has recently developed software that allows several existing
theorem provers—e.g., Coq, HOL, Matita—to output proofs into a format that
Dedukti can check independently from those provers [2].
1.2 Proof checking vs proof reconstruction
What is typically called proof checking generally contains elements of proof re-
construction: that is, the process of checking whether or not a given document
is a proof might require computing some details that are not present explicitly
in the document. For example, even for rather low-level and detailed notions of
proof, it is seldom the case that one would expect to have every detail present
within a formal proof object. For example, in order to check that the assumptions
(p ⊃ p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ q) and (p ⊃ p ⊃ q) and the rule of modus ponens, written
schematically as “from A and A ⊃ B, conclude B”, infers p ⊃ q, it is not likely
that one needs to provide in the proof itself the explicit ordering of assumption
and the binding of schematic variables [A 7→ (p ⊃ p ⊃ q), B 7→ (p ⊃ q)]. Such an
ordering and binding can easily be computed, leaving less to store in the proof
document.
Existing theorem provers often contain much more significant notions of proof
reconstruction. For example, the Boyer-Moore theorem prover attempts to fill in
significant gaps between lemmas using various proof procedures parametrized by
the collection of previously proved lemmas [5]. If the proof procedure is not able
to fill in a gap in a sequence of lemmas, the user must design some additional
lemmas to split up that gap into more manageable parts. Other theorem provers,
particularly those based on the LCF framework [19], allow functional programs
(usually in a variant of ML) to be executed in order to compute ways to complete
the gaps between lemmas (or between hypotheses and goal). In other systems, an
interactive theorem prover might call a completely automated prover in order to
complete a step of inference: for example, Isabelle can call the Vampire theorem
prover to close a gap in a user’s proof attempt [28].
1.3 The community of logic programming
Oddly enough, the community that has invested a great deal of energy into
providing effective implementations of logic—namely, the logic programming
community—has not traditionally been involved with proof checking. There are
at least three likely reasons for this mismatch between that community and those
interested in theorem proving and proof checking.
Efficiency versus soundness In proof checking, logical soundness is everything :
there is no reason to be doing proof checking if one is not confident that the
underlying logic engine is logically sound. The logic programming community
has often emphasized efficiency instead of logical soundness: for example, many
Prolog systems have not supported the occurs-check in unification since that
was seen as a feature only needed for toy examples [34, Section 3.3]. Experience
with automated theorem proving shows, however, that soundness of inference
critically depends on the presence of occurs-check in unification. Of course, a
programming language like Prolog can still be used to implement proof checkers
even when unification is unsound since any programming language can be used
to build, in principle, any programming task. One would suspect, however, that
logic programming languages should have a much more immediate and trans-
parent ways to support the effective implementation of logic.
Lack of logical expressiveness Another aspect of most logic programming lan-
guages is that they do not have direct support for quantified formulas and the
concomitant operations of substitution into and unification of expressions con-
taining bindings. While individual Prolog clauses are interpreted as universally
quantified, such quantification is implicit. Furthermore, no direct and logical sup-
port for bindings is available within Prolog even though the interplay between
formula-level bindings (quantifiers) and term-level bindings (λ-abstractions) has
been well understood since Church’s Simple Theory of Types [8]. Thus, while
Prolog provides many logical principles that could be used to implement proof
checkers, that support does not extend to much of logic itself.
Lack of abstractions There is still at least one other reason that logic program-
ming can be a poor match with proof checking: most Prolog systems do not
support rich forms of abstractions, such as abstract datatypes and procedural
(higher-order) abstraction. Each of these features were explicitly introduced into
the first design and implementation of the functional programming language ML
since they were seen as important for building the LCF proof system [19]. Ab-
stract datatypes help provide guarantees that, for example, there are only certain
ways to build objects of type thm (the type for theorems): once thm is estab-
lished, it is made into an abstract datatype and the design of ML’s type system
enforces that theorems can only arise from the originally provided constructors
and functions. Similarly, higher-order programming in ML was introduced to
allow for certain “kernel” operations (the tacticals) to have their trusted code
separated from the “clients” code (the tactics).
The lack of expressiveness and abstraction can be addressed within logic pro-
gramming if one is willing to move beyond first-order Horn clauses for fragments
of higher-order, intuitionistic logic [29]. In fact, λProlog [12, 31, 33] and Twelf
[35] are two logic programming languages that treat bindings in expressions and
proofs directly as part of their logical foundations. Furthermore, λProlog also
exploits features of its underlying logic to provide logically sound notions of
modules and abstract datatypes as well as higher-order programming (such as
is found in most functional programming languages).
Where should we begin in looking for connections between the logic program-
ming paradigm and proof checking? Remarkably, one has to look no further than
the recent literature of proof theory (see references in Section 3) to find a frame-
work where relations and not functions dominate, where bounded backtracking
search has obvious and immediate applications, and where formula-level and
term-level abstractions occur naturally together. In addition, the topic of proof
theory presents a mathematically and not a technologically notion of proof.
2 Proof theory as a framework
If a modern theorem prover outputs a proof as a (persistent) document, that
proof document is usually based on specific technology built into the prover.
On some other occasions, provers output documents meant for tracing and de-
bugging. It is the exceptional theorem prover that outputs a document that is
intended to outlast the (version of the) prover itself.1 Given the existence of the
mathematical literature on proof theory initiated by Frege and Gentzen, proofs-
as-documents can be as eternal as Peano numerals: 0, s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))),
etc.
Once proofs are liberated from the technology that produces them, then
they can be checked by independently constructed checking programs which can
be written by anyone keen to develop their own trusted base of code instead
of adopting someone else’s code. Once checked, such proofs can be placed in
1 Some specialized theorem provers related to SAT solving have adopted standards of
outputting their proof evidence (see, for example, [36]).
libraries that survive changes in theorem proving and proof checking technolo-
gies. Thus, proofs can be used to communicate trust between different provers
and across changes in technology. In order to reach such a status in the shar-
ing and trusting of proofs, we probably need to design a framework based on a
mathematically well defined and sophisticated notion of proof. Examining the
literature on proof theory, however, reveals a number of formally defined proof
structures. In the earliest days, Frege and Hilbert proposed rather simple, linear
proof structures; Gentzen introduced both the sequent calculus as well as natu-
ral deduction; later, resolution refutations and tableaux proof systems were also
introduce, in part, to support automation of theorem proving. Still more struc-
tures can be found that can be accepted as proofs, such as proof nets, matings,
deep inference, and winning strategies.
In this paper, I will outline a multi-year effort that proposes to use the
sequent calculus as the assembly language of proof and to describe how to compile
many other higher-level notions of proof into that assembly language. The formal
devices for making such definition of proof languages will be based on the notion
of focused proofs for first-order classical and intuitionistic logics. We illustrate
such a proof system in the next section.
3 Focused versions of sequent calculi
The sequent calculus of Gentzen provides an appealing form of formal proof
structure since they can be used to describe proofs in both classical, intuitionistic,
and linear logics. They also support propositional, first-order, and higher-order
logics and do so in a modular and clear fashion. The cut-elimination theorem
[15] also reveals that this notion of proof supports sophisticated manipulations
(such as substitution and composition of proofs). On the other hand, the proofs
in the sequent calculus can be chaotic: if a proof of a given sequent exists,
many trivial and not-so-trivial variations of that proof also exists. All these
variants work to hide structure. Relying on the small inference steps that are
part of Gentzen’s presentation of the sequent calculus not only makes finding
sequent calculus proofs difficult, it also makes communicating them challenging.
Consider the following example (taken from [4]). Attempting to prove the sequent
Γ ` ∃x∃y[(p x y) ∨ ((q x y) ∨ (r x y))], where Γ contains, say, a hundred
formulas. The search for a (cut-free) proof of this sequent can confront the need
to choose from among a hundred-and-one introduction rules. If we choose the
right-side introduction rule, we will then be left with, again, a hundred-and-one
introduction rules to apply to the premise. Thus, reducing this sequent to, say,
Γ ` (q t s) requires picking one path of choices in a space of 1014 choices.
One of the first attempts to use sequent calculus in computer science needed
to develop a normal form of sequent proof that discarded a great deal of those
variants. The uniform proofs of [29, 32]—with its notion of alternating phases of
goal-reduction and backchaining—was used to provide a general framework for
defining proof search in logic programming. With the advent of linear logic [16],
that two phase structure was extended to all of linear logic using Andreoli’s fo-
cused proof system [1] and the notion of polarity [1, 17]. Soon afterwards, various
focused proof systems for intuitionistic logic [6, 13, 22, 23] and classical logic [10,
17, 25] appeared. The LJF and LKF frameworks of [27] can be seen as offering a
general framework and generalization to these various classical and intuitionistic
focused proof systems.
We limit our attention here to first-order classical logic. A similar develop-
ment holds for intuitionistic logic as well.
Polarizing connectives The emphasis on focused proofs is an emphasis on
proof structure and not provability. For example, consider the following different
ways to write the introduction rules for disjunction and conjunction in a one-
sided sequent system.
` Γ,B1 ` Γ,B2
` Γ,B1 ∧B2
` Γ1, B1 ` Γ2, B2




` Γ,B1 ∨B2 i ∈ {1, 2}
Given that the structural rules of weakening and contractions are available in
classical logic, the first pair of rules and the second pair of rules are inter-
admissible inference rules: any sequent provable with one element of the pair
is provable also with the second member of the pair. Notice also that the first
member of each pair is invertible while the second member is not invertible.
People presenting proof systems for classical logic or who are implementing such
systems generally pick one member from each pair and that choice is usually the
invertible rule. Given our interest here in proof structures (an not just provabil-
ity), our eventual focused proof system will contain all four of these introduction
rules. They will be distinguished from each other by having them introduce dif-
ferent polarized versions of disjunction and conjunction.
` Γ,B1 ` Γ,B2
` Γ,B1 ∧− B2
` Γ1, B1 ` Γ2, B2
` Γ1, Γ2, B1 ∧+ B2
` Γ,B1, B2
` Γ,B1 ∨− B2
` Γ,Bi
` Γ,B1 ∨+ B2
i ∈ {1, 2}
The introduction rules for the negative polarized connectives (∧− and ∨−) are
invertible while the introduction rules for the positive polarized connectives (∧+
and ∨+) are not invertible. The units for these connectives are also polarized
similarly: t−, t+, f−, and f+, and these have the following introduction rules.
` Γ, t− ` t+
` Γ
` Γ, f−
(There is no introduction rule for the positive false f+.)
Some connectives have fixed polarity: universal quantification is negative and
its de Morgan dual, existential quantification, is positive. Atoms can be either
positive or negative: this choice can be made in an arbitrary but fixed fashion.
The negated atom ¬A has the opposite polarity to A. A formula has positive
or negative polarity depending only on its top-level logical connective (if it has
one) or on the polarity as a literal.
Grouping don’t-care and don’t-know non-determinism If several invert-
ible rules can be applied to yield a given sequent then those rules can be applied
in any order and, in fact, in all possible orderings to yield a proof. In order to
factor away such don’t-care non-determinism, we introduce the notion of the ⇑
phase in focused proof construction display the invertible rules as follows:
` Θ ⇑ t−, Γ
` Θ ⇑A,Γ ` Θ ⇑B,Γ
` Θ ⇑A ∧− B,Γ
` Θ ⇑ Γ
` Θ ⇑ f−, Γ
` Θ ⇑A,B, Γ
` Θ ⇑A ∨− B,Γ
` Θ ⇑ [y/x]B,Γ
` Θ ⇑ ∀x.B, Γ †
` Θ,C ⇑ Γ
` Θ ⇑ C, Γ store
Here, sequents are of the form ` Θ ⇑Γ , where Θ is a schematic variable ranging
over multisets of formulas and Γ is a schematic variable ranging over lists of
formulas. A list is used here instead of a multiset as a way to reduce the don’t-
care non-determinism: we only need to consider introduction rules on the first
formulas of that list. In the ∀-introduction rule, the † proviso is the usual one: the
variable y is not free in the lower sequent. In the store rule, C is a positive formula
or negative literal: this rule is responsible for recognizing that the first formula
in the right-hand context cannot be introduced by an invertible inference. In
general, the context Θ contains only positive formulas and negative literals.
Another phase contains sequents of the form ` Θ ⇓ B where Θ is as before
and B is a formula. The introduction rules associated to this phase are written
as follows.
` Θ ⇓ t+
` Θ ⇓B1 ` Θ ⇓B2
` Θ ⇓B1 ∧+ B2
` Θ ⇓Bi i ∈ {1, 2}
` Θ ⇓B1 ∨+ B2
` Θ ⇓ [t/x]B
` Θ ⇓ ∃x.B
Structural and Identity rules The following two “structural” rules are needed
to move between these two phases.
` ¬Pa, Θ ⇓ Pa init
` Θ ⇑B ` Θ ⇑ ¬B
` Θ ⇑ · cut
` Θ ⇑N
` Θ ⇓N release
` P,Θ ⇓ P
` P,Θ ⇑ · decide
Here, P is a positive formula; N a negative formula; Pa a positive literal; C a
positive formula or negative literal; and ¬B is the negation normal form of the
negation of B.
Synthetic inference rules One of the purposes of introducing a focused proof
system is to make the following identification: the phases introduce new, syn-
thetic inference rules. Gentzen’s introduction and structural rules form the as-
sembly instructions of proof and the synthetic inference rules form the higher-
level notions of proof. For example, assume that Θ contains the formula a ∧+
b ∧+ ¬c and that we have a derivation that Decides on this formula.
` Θ ⇓ a Init ` Θ ⇓ b Init
` Θ,¬c ⇑ ·
` Θ ⇑ ¬c Store
` Θ ⇓ ¬c Release
` Θ ⇓ a ∧+ b ∧+ ¬c ∧
+
` Θ ⇑ · Decide
This derivation is possible if and only if Θ is of the form ¬a,¬b,Θ′. Thus, the
“macro-rule” is
` ¬a,¬b,¬c,Θ′ ⇑ ·
` ¬a,¬b,Θ′ ⇑ ·
Soundness and completeness of focusing The formulas used in LK are
unpolarized while those in LKF are polarized. In order to state soundness and
completeness of focusing, we must introduce the notion of polarizing a formula.
Given the unpolarized formula B, let Bˆ be one of the exponentially many for-
mulas that result by placing + or − on the occurrences of ∨ and ∧ as well as
attributing polarization to the atoms in B. (The quantifiers have fixed polarities:
∀ is negative and ∃ is positive.) The soundness theorem for LKF is immediate:
Assume that ` · ⇑ Bˆ has an LKF proof. We can recover an LK proof by simply
replacing the ⇑ and ⇓ with commas, deleting some repetitions of sequents, and
dropping the + and − annotations on the propositional connectives. Conversely,
completeness (which is proved in [27]) states that if B is a first-order theorem
and Bˆ is any polarization of B then ` · ⇑ Bˆ is provable in LKF. A consequence
of soundness and completeness implies that if any polarization of B is provable
in LKF then every polarization is provable in LKF. Clearly, polarization is not
relevant to provability but is relevant to the structure of proofs.
4 Foundational proof certificates
The two phases in LKF are strikingly different. The invertible ⇑ phase can be
built from the bottom up as a purely deterministic computation: one just applies
the inference rules in a straightforward fashion. On the other hand, the ⇓ phase
is not straightforward since some of the inference rules need information that
is lacking from the conclusion: in particular, the ∃ introduction rule requires a
substitution term and the ∨+ introduction rule requires an indicator of whether
to select the left or right disjunct. If this information is lacking, then the con-
struction of the proof can be seen as a non-deterministic computation, where
choices and substitution terms are guessed.
It is now easy to see that the focused proof system in Section 3 provides a
communication protocol between an entity that possesses some evidence that a
formula is a theorem and a low-level tool attempting to build a sequent calculus
proof from the bottom-up of that proposed theorem.
Ξ ` Θ ⇑ t−, Γ
Ξ1 ` Θ ⇑A,Γ Ξ2 ` Θ ⇑B,Γ ∧c(Ξ,Ξ1, Ξ2)
Ξ ` Θ ⇑A ∧− B,Γ
Ξ ′ ` Θ ⇑ Γ fc(Ξ,Ξ ′)
Ξ ` Θ ⇑ f−, Γ
Ξ ′ ` Θ ⇑A,B, Γ ∨c(Ξ,Ξ ′)
Ξ ` Θ ⇑A ∨− B,Γ
Ξ ′ ` Θ ⇑ [y/x]B,Γ ∀c(Ξ,Ξ ′)
Ξ ` Θ ⇑ ∀x.B, Γ †
truee(Ξ)
Ξ ` Θ ⇓ t+
Ξ1 ` Θ ⇓B1 Ξ2 ` Θ ⇓B2 ∧e(Ξ,Ξ1, Ξ2)
Ξ ` Θ ⇓B1 ∧+ B2
Ξ ′ ` Θ ⇓Bi i ∈ {1, 2} ∨e(Ξ,Ξ ′, i)
Ξ ` Θ ⇓B1 ∨+ B2
Ξ ′ ` Θ ⇓ [t/x]B ∃e(Ξ,Ξ ′, t)
Ξ ` Θ ⇓ ∃x.B
Ξ1 ` Θ ⇑B Ξ2 ` Θ ⇑ ¬B cute(Ξ,Ξ1, Ξ2, B)
Ξ ` Θ ⇑ · cut
Ξ ′ ` Θ ⇑N releasee(Ξ,Ξ ′)
Ξ ` Θ ⇓N release
inite(Ξ, l) 〈l,¬Pa〉 ∈ Θ
Ξ ` Θ ⇓ Pa init
Ξ ′ ` Θ ⇓ P decidee(Ξ,Ξ ′, l) 〈l,P 〉 ∈ Θ positive(P )
Ξ ` Θ ⇑ · decide
Ξ ′ ` Θ, 〈l,C〉 ⇑ Γ storec(Ξ,Ξ ′, l)
Ξ ` Θ ⇑ C, Γ store
Fig. 1. The augmented LKF proof system LKFa.
One way to implement such a protocol would be to instrument the focused
proof system LKF with certain augmentations as shown in Figure 1. The aug-
mentation is accomplished in three simple steps: (i) a proof certificate term,
denoted by the syntactic variable Ξ is added to every sequent; (ii) every infer-
ence rule of LKF is given an additional premise using either an expert predicate
or a clerk predicate; and (iii) the multiset of formulas to the left of the arrows
⇑ and ⇓ is replaced with a multiset of pairs of an index and a formula. (Viewing
this figure in color shows the augmentations in blue.) Clearly, the LKF proof
system can be recovered from LKF a by removing all occurrences of the syntac-
tic variable Ξ and by removing all premises with a subscripted e or c as well as
replacing all occurrences of tuples such as 〈l, B〉 with just B.
Notice that the extra premise added to invertible rules are called clerks:
in such inference rules, only simple computations are done and, in general, no
information in a certificate term needs to be consumed. On the other hand, the
extra premise added to non-invertible rules are called experts: these predicates
are responsible for examining certificates and, possibly, extracting information
from them. We also allow for experts to invoke non-determinism: that is, they
can guess additional information (such as substitution terms).
Depending on exactly how one defines and uses certificate terms, indexes,
and the clerk and expert predicates (e.g., ∧c(·, ·, ·), ∃e(·, ·, ·), etc), the LKF a in-
ference rules can be directed to build widely varying proof structures. Collecting
together such definitions yields what we call an FPC, that is, a foundational
proof certificate definition. We shall present an example shortly.
5 Proof checking as logic programming
It is possible to see the inference rules in Figure 1 as describing a logic program:
in particular, Figure 2 contains part of a λProlog specification for several of those
rules. The first five lines of Figure 2 declare the types, constants, and predicates
used to encode first-order polarized (LKF) formulas; the next seven lines declare
the types and predicates of clerks and expert predicates; the next three lines
provide the type declaration of the predicates that form the core of the proof
checking kernel; and the remaining lines contain six clauses that are a direct
specification of six inference rules from Figure 1: specifically of the inference
rules for introducing ∧−, ∀, and ∃B, and the rules for store, decide, and initial.
All the remaining augmented inference rules can be specified in a similar fashion.
We have used λProlog here instead of Prolog for the following two major
reasons.
Bindings in formulas and proofs. λProlog encodes bindings in formulas (quanti-
fiers) and in proofs (eigenvariables) directly and implements them into its unifica-
tion and substitution mechanisms. Achieving a Prolog implementation is possible
but would require implementing such binding structures and associated logical
operations, all rather difficult things to get right.
Context management and its dynamics during proof search. Focused and aug-
mented sequents contain a context denoted by the Θ: this is intended to be a
multiset of pairs of indexes and formulas. This multiset only needs to support
the following operations: add a pair to the multiset (the store rule) and select
a formula (nondeterministically) from the multiset by providing an index (the
decide and initial rules). Notice that we do not need to know how many members
there are in Θ nor anything about possible orderings between pairs. Note also
that no functional dependency is assumed to hold between indexes and formula:
that is, many formulas may be associated to the same index within a given Θ
context. For all these reasons, the hypothetical context on λProlog serves as
an interesting and direct implementation of this aspect of these inference rules.
(See, for example, the fourth clause in Figure 2.)
By forging such a direct link between a proof checking kernel and a logic
program, that kernel has access to backtracking search and unification, which
means that it can be used to support proof reconstruction: if a proof certificate
does not contain all the details necessary to complete a (sequent calculus) proof,
then it should be possible to allow backtracking and unification to discover some
of them.
The full process of defining and checking a certain format of proof evidence
can now be done as follows.
kind form , i type.
type nand , por form -> form -> form.
type all , some (i -> form) -> form.
type complem form -> form -> o.
type pos_or_lit form -> o.
kind cert , index type.
type andC cert -> cert -> cert -> o.
type allC cert -> (i -> cert) -> o.
type storeC cert -> cert -> index -> o.
type initE cert -> index -> o.
type someE cert -> cert -> i -> o.
type decideE cert -> cert -> index -> o.
type uparrow cert -> list form -> o.
type downarrow cert -> form -> o.
type store index -> form -> o.
uparrow Cert ((nand A B):: Gamma) :- andC Cert Cert1 Cert2 ,
uparrow Cert1 (A:: Gamma), uparrow Cert2 (B::Gamma ).
uparrow Cert ((all B):: Gamma) :- allC Cert Cert ’,
pi x\ uparrow (Cert ’ x) ((B x):: Gamma ).
downarrow Cert (some B) :- someE Cert Cert ’ T,
downarrow Cert ’ (B T).
uparrow Cert (C:: Gamma) :- pos_or_lit C,
storeC Cert Cert ’ Idx , store Idx C => uparrow Cert Gamma.
uparrow Cert nil :- decideE Cert Cert ’ Index , store Index B,
downarrow Cert ’ B.
downarrow Cert B :- initE Cert Idx , store Idx C, complem B C.
Fig. 2. A λProlog implementation of part of Figure 1
1. Pick some discipline to polarize a given classical logic formula into a polarized
(LKF) formula.
2. Provide the signature (term constructors) for certificate (terms of type cert)
and indexes (terms of type index). Any term structure possible in λProlog
are allowed for these structures.
3. Provide logic program specifications of the clerk and expert relations.
4. Prove the goal uparrow Cert (B::nil) where B is the polarized form of the
proposed theorem and Cert is the supplied certificate term (proof evidence).
6 Non-determinism in proof checking
In general, clerk predicates are intended to be functional: in the case of the
conjunctive-clerk, this means that for every Ξ there exists at most one Ξ1 and
at most one Ξ2 such that ∧c(Ξ,Ξ1, Ξ2) is provable.
One could insist that this is also the case with experts. For example, if the ∃
expert predicate is functional then for every Ξ for which ∃e(Ξ,Ξ ′, t) is provable,
the continuation certificate Ξ ′ and the substitution term t are uniquely deter-
mined. This can be achieved if, for example, the certificate simply stores this
substitution term inside itself. While such proof certificates are clearly possible
to design and check, one might want some flexibility in the design of certificates:
for example, storing all substitution instances might require certificates to be
huge. If such substitution terms could be inferred from context using, say, the
unification mechanism of logic programming, then the size of a proof certificate
might be much smaller. Thus, allowing the proof checker to also reconstruct
details of a proof allows proof certificates to be possibly much smaller in size.
For a specific example of the trade-off between proof size and proof checking,
consider the following example (taken from [7]). It is possible to convert some
decision procedures into proof certificates. For example, consider the procedure
for determining whether or not a given propositional formula is a tautology:
first compute the conjunctive normal form of the formula and then check that
all the resulting clauses contain complementary literals. It is an easy matter
to define a proof certificate encapsulating this procedure. Following the four
steps mentioned above, we choose to polarize the connectives in a propositional
classical formula using the negative (invertible) connectives. We then arrive at
the following code (which specifies the result of the second and third steps).
type lit index.
type cnf cert.
andC cnf cnf cnf & initE cnf lit.
orC cnf cnf & decideE cnf cnf lit.
falseC cnf cnf & storeC cnf cnf lit.
releaseE cnf cnf.
Here, there is exactly one proof certificate—just the token cnf. Similarly, there is
just one index—the token lit—which is used to index all stored formulas. Note
that the only formulas stored in this way are (both positive and negative) literals.
Thus, the association between indexes and formulas is not functional and, as a
result, the decide rule will be asked to chose some formula with index lit for
which a complement is found. Such a step works perfectly in a logic programming
setting where the decide rule (on index lit) is immediately followed by the
initial rule (on index lit): thus the decide rule will generate positive literals
and the initial rule will test those against available negative literals. Notice
that if we required the indexing mechanism as well as the decide and initial
experts to be functional, we would need to insert into the certificate a great deal
of indexing information: since there can be exponentially many clauses in the
conjunctive normal form of a propositional formula, such certificates would be
huge, in contrast to the description of the cnf certificate that is described here.
7 Conclusion
Proof checking has been part of the history and development of high-level lan-
guages, starting, in particular, with the LCF system and the ML meta-language
for it [19]. I have argued here that proof checking can be closely linked to logic
programming. Such a close linkage should benefit both communities. There are,
however, some challenges ahead for such a close relationship to actually occur.
One such challenge is that implementers and designers of logic programming
languages have often favored efficiency and expressiveness over logical sound-
ness: witness the presence of unification without the occurs-check, negation-as-
failure, assert/retract, etc. Proof checking is a setting where logical soundness
is paramount. While soundness can be delivered using unsound, quasi-logical
processing, the logic programming community should certainly be able to de-
liver much more interesting and ambitious approaches to the implementation of
logical deduction.
A second such challenge would be to have powerful techniques for reasoning
about logic programming specifications. It is possible to view provability from
Horn clauses as a simple inductive definition (a feature that a number of theorem
provers support), but more direct support seems desirable since provability has
more properties than just any inductive definition. In the case of logic program-
ming with hypothetical reasoning and with bindings, as with λProlog, the simple
inductive style approach is problematic. Fortunately, initial steps to address this
challenge have been made in the design and implementation of the Abella theo-
rem prover [3, 14] which is capable of reasoning directly with specifications like
those found in λProlog. Thus, it should be possible to develop formal proofs of
correctness for λProlog based proof checkers using Abella and related tools.
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